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Comments
The Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Determining Legislative Intent in




"Must we concert ourselves with the meaning of the bills we pass,
gentlemen? . . . I understand it is the duty of the Supreme Court to
interpret them . . ."*
* GRIN AND BEAR IT by George Lichty © 1955 Field Enterprises, Inc. courtesy of Field
Newspaper Syndicate.
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California courts, like all other common-law courts, are called upon
frequently to interpret the law as set down by the legislature. Certain
basic principles guide the court in this endeavor. The purpose of statu-
tory interpretation is said to be the ascertainment of legislative intent in
order to effectuate the purpose of the law.' When attempting to deter-
mine the intent of the legislature, a court will turn first to the words of
the statute;2 further, a court is required to apply the statutory language
to promote rather than defeat the objective of the law.3 In interpreting
a statute, a court may look beyond the wording of the statute itself,
indeed, judges are to take into account such matters as the object in
view, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and
contemporaneous administrative construction of the statute.4 An addi-
tional rule of statutory construction requires that a statute in deroga-
tion of the common law be strictly and narrowly construed,' although
California does not always follow this mandate. Given a mandate to
explore all possible sources,6 the appellate courts recently have located
evidence of legislative intent from many sources outside the literal
wording of the statute.7 This comment will examine a model for deter-
mining the relative merits of extrinsic aids. Sources currently used in
California will then be analyzed under this model. An analysis of the
1. People v. Younger, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 40, 544 P.2d 1322, 1328, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1976);
Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 675 (1959);
see People v. Porpora, 91 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 13, 27-28, 154 Cal. Rptr. 400, 409 (1979); Kaiser
Foundation Hosp. v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 336, 351, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 377 (1978); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859.
2. Tripp v. Swoap, 17 Cal. 3d 671, 679, 552 P.2d 749, 755, 131 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (1976);
Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 230, 514 P.2d 1224, 1229, 110
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49 (1973); see People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d. 1 5 (1950). As
Justice Felix Frankfurter said, "Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed
statute, one certainly begins there." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 535 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter].
3. Steilberg v. Lackner, 69 Cal. App. 3d 780, 785, 138 Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1977); City of Los
Angeles v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 330 P.2d 888, 890 (1958).
4. English v. County of Alameda, 70 Cal. App. 3d 266, 233-34, 138 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638
(1977); Afford v. Pierno, 27 Cal. App. 3d 682, 688, 104 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1972).
5. See CAL. CIv. CODE §4. When the legislature attempts to formulate new law that is
totally divorced from previous common law tenets, such as family law or community property,
extrinsic aids arguably form an even more meaningful background for statutory interpretation,
because legislative intent stands alone without the benefit (or hinderance) of prior common law
principles. See generally Big Sur Properties v. Mott, 62 Cal. App. 3d 99, 132 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1976).
6. It appears to be a well-settled rule that "courts may and should have recourse to available
extrinsic aids in order to discover the meaning and purpose of legislation." Shafer v. Registered
Pharmacists Union Local 1172, 16 Cal. 2d 379, 383, 106 P.2d 404, 405-06 (1940).
7. See generally People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
Chief Justice John Marshall said, "Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legisla-
ture, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358, 385 (1805).
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recent case of People v. Tanner8 will demonstrate the current confusion
of California courts in their use of these outside sources. Finally, this
comment will conclude that the use of the model will enable the courts
of California to utilize various extrinsic aids in a more efficient manner
when determining legislative intent.9 For purposes of this comment,
the assumption is made that a court is faced with a situation in which
extrinsic aids will assist the court in its interpretation or construction of
a given statute;' ° hermaneutics" and the "plain meaning rule"' 2 will
not be discussed since their relationship to the use of extrinsic aids is
tangential at best. With these limitations in mind, this comment will
turn to a discussion of the theoretical model to be used in the analysis
of these extrinsic aids.
8. 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596, P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
9. Many commentators have asserted that the entire notion of a collective legislative intent
is highly artificial and perhaps nonexistent. Professor Max Radin has stated, for example, that
legislative intent is ". . . a queerly amorphous piece of slag." Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REv. 863, 872 (1930)
This comment will not address the issue of one person's opinion reflecting the intent of the
entire legislature. For a detailed discussion of this area, see 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION §45.06 (4th ed. L972) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
10. "Interpretation" and "construction" will be used interchangeably in this comment. One
commentator has said that
interpretation and construction have often been distinguished by the courts; but for all
practical purposes they may be regarded as synonymous terms, for the point at which the
former ends and the latter begins is not possible of exact determination.
de Sloovere, Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. 407, 411 (1932). See
generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at §45.04.
11. Hermeneutics, the science of the interpretation of words, is usually considered a frustrat-
ing and inconclusive exercise by the leading commentators. See generally, Frankfurter, supra note
2. California courts, by way of example, have recently been determining the meaning of such
words as "amend", see Card v. Community Redevelopment Agency of South Pasadena, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 570, 573, 131 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (1976); "public entity", see Vallas v. City of Chula Vista,
56 Cal. App. 3d 382, 387, 128 Cal. Rptr. 469,473 (1976); and "whenever", which turns out to mean
"if", see People v. White, 77 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 17, 22, 144 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 (1978).
12. The "plain meaning" rule and the "clear and unambiguous language rule" appear to be
inextricably woven together in the California courts. See Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of
El Segundo, 19 Cal. 3d 152, 155-56, 561 P.2d. 244, 246, 137 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156 (1977); Teacher's
Management & Inv. Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz, 64 Cal. App. 3d 438,445, 134 Cal. Rptr. 523, 528
(1976). Courts have also examined outside aids even though there was no ambiguity, in order to
avoid absurd rusults. See Leffels v. Municipal Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 569, 572, 126 Cal. Rptr.
773, 775 (1976). But see Regina v. Ojibway, 8 CRIM. L. Q. 137 (Toronto, 1965). The defendant
was convicted of violating the Small Birds Act by shooting his hopelessly injured horse, the horse
having a down (feather) pillow on its back at the time of the shooting. The court decided that, for
purposes of the Small Birds Act, which prohibited the killing or injuring of birds, (1) a horse with
feathers on its back was a bird, and (2) the act of killing a lame horse with feathers on its back
therefore constituted a violation of the Act. This writer (and hopefully the reader) tends to doubt
the validity and seriousness of the opinion from its beginning, which states that the author of the
opinion is Blue, J.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court has stated that the altering of statutes should not occur if
the purpose of the statute does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history."
Estate of Kramme, 20 Cal. 3d 567, 572, 573 P.2d 1369, 1272, 143 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 (1978) (em-
phasis added). This statement would seem to imply that an "either/or" situation exists between
an examination of the statute itself and the legislative history of its passage.
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BUILDING A THEORETICAL MODEL
A fundamental difficulty with statutory interpretation by California
courts appears to be that a particular source will be used without an
examination of its relative merits.'" As early as 1962, concern was
voiced that "the [California] courts have not fixed on any criteria for
determining relevancy, materiality, and probative value. . ." of extrin-
sic aids to the process of statutory construction. 4 It has been suggested
that all extrinsic aids may be evaluated by the presence of four com-
mon factors.' 5 These factors, which have been postulated to evaluate a
given extrinsic aid, are credibility, contemporaneity, proximity, and
context.6 By applying these elements to a particular source, the rela-
tive weight that should be accorded to a given extrinsic aid may be
judged. No single element will determine the validity of a given
source; rather, these elements will invariably overlap at numerous
points. The reader is therefore cautioned at the outset that, although
these factors are somewhat general, all of them should be used in the
analysis of any outside materials to estimate fairly the value of those
sources.
A. Credibility
An initial examination of an extrinsic aid should include a determi-
nation of its credibility, which includes an inquiry into whether a given
source is a reliable indicator of legislative action or understanding.'
7
Another relevant point of inquiry in this area would include whether
the material is analytical or explanatory, as opposed to politically or
otherwise potentially biased.' 8 Generally speaking, the more explana-
tory and analytical an aid is, the more credible it is. 19 At the same time,
the character of the source of the extrinsic aid is an important consider-
ation. For example, material from a respected source such as the Cali-
13. See generally People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
14. Transcript of Proceedings on the Subject of Legislative Intent (Los Angeles, December 6,
1962) at 112 (testimony of Arvo Van Alstyne, Professor of Law, U.C.L.A.) [hereinafter cited as
TRANSCRIPT].
15. See Rhodes, White, & Goldman, The Searchfor Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in
Florida, 6 FLA. ST. L. REV. 383, 403 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Rhodes]. This article was written
by two Florida attorneys and a former director of a Florida legislative committee staff.
16. Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403-04. It should be noted that the authors of this article on
Floridian sources of legislative intent attempted to briefly define these four terms. This comment
will adopt these terms and seek to more fully explain them in the context of the extrinsic aids that
are being evaluated. Although adopting these terms, this comment may differ in its perceptions of
the precise definitions given those terms by the authors of the Florida article.
17. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403.
18. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403.
19. See Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry, 235 Cal. App. 2d 591, 603-04,45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 520
(1965).
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fornia Law Revision Commission" would generally be given greater
credibility than a letter from a group having no interest in the bill and
no connection with the legislature at all. Impartiality in an extrinsic
aid is said to contribute to its credibility as well.2" Finally, the value of
the source of the extrinsic aid, as measured by the legislators them-
selves during the decision-making process, is considered an important
part of the source's validity.22
A distinction between credibility and the motives of an organization
in promulgating a given aid must be made because of possible confu-
sion in this area. Motives, or the stimuli prompting a person or organi-
zation to act in a certain way, may be varied and conflicting, as well as
unrelated to the process of interpreting a statute. Although the words
and background of the source are presumably before the legislature
during consideration of a particular bill, motives may not be known to
those actually enacting the legislation. For example, a legislator might
in a later court proceeding testify with respect to his or her motive in
submitting a bill for consideration,23 even though he or she remained
silent on this point at the time the bill was considered by the legislature.
Hence motives, and particularly individual motives, are not considered
as evidence of legislative intent.24
B. Contemporaneity
The contemporaneity of a source relative to the creation and enact-
ment of a bill will be a factor in determining the worth of the source.25
This concurrence between the bill and the outside material should gen-
erally be close so that the extrinsic aid actually plays a part in the
thinking process of the legislators during the enactment process.26 An
analysis of contemporaneity should include a determination of whether
the aid in question reflects the final form of the statute or is just an
opinion of a provisional version of the bill.2 7 If the material sought to
20. See notes 79-90 and accompanying text infra.
21. See generally Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Gouge
v. David, 185 Or. 437, 448, 202 P.2d 489, 496 (1949); Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to
Statutory Construction in Oregon, 29 OR. L. REV. 1, 9-10, 17 (1949).
22. See In re Clerkship of Circuit Court, 90 F. 248, 251 (1898); de Sloovere, ExtrinsicAids in
the.Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 544 (1940); SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at
§48.17.
23. See In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 327, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (1935).
24. See Kriz v. Taylor, 92 Cal. App. 3d 302, 312-13, 154 Cal. Rptr. 824, 831 (1979). See also
In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 589, 546 P.2d 1371, 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 430
(1976); Grant v. Adams, 69 Cal. App. 3d 127, 135, 137 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (1977); Bragg v. City of
Auburn, 253 Cal. App. 2d 50, 54, 61 Cal. Rptr.284, 287-88 (1967); see generally SUTHERLAND,
supra note 9, at §48.17. The Bouquet case is examined in detail in the text accompanying notes
164-173 infra.
25. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403.
26. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403.
27. The Rhodes article includes this analysis under the development of the context factor.
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be introduced as evidence of legislative intent was created prior to or
during the movement of the bill through the legislature, amendments
subsequent to its publication must be studied in order to ascertain the
continued vitality of the material.28 Thus, an aid should be available to
the legislature before enactment; the publication of material after en-
actment would reflect the tenor of the new law rather than influence the
passage of a bill through the legislature.29 Consequently, the longer the
passage of time between the instant of enactment and the development
or publication of the extrinsic aid, the less the aid reflects the true intent
of legislature during the lawmaking process.
30
C. Proximiy
The third element, proximity, has been defined as the closeness of
the aid to the "essence of the legislative action."' I Generally, the closer
the origins of the aid are to the legislative process, the more weight the
source is given.32 For example, a legislative committee that considers
the bill would tend to be closer to the legislative process than an outside
organization such as the State Bar.33 An examination of any extrinsic
aid, then, should include a discussion of its origins and the proximity of
these origins to the functions of the legislature.34
D. Context
The final criteria for judging the value of an extrinsic aid is the con-
text of the aid as it relates to the legislative process. 35 This element is
concerned with the historical circumstances surrounding the passage of
a new statute and the purposes for which the extrinsic aid was promul-
gated.36 Such evidence has long been considered helpful to the courts
in interpreting legislation37 although one Supreme Court Justice has
This author feels that there is a more logical connection to a correct and timely promulgation of
an extrinsic aid through a contemporaneity analysis rather than an analysis of the actual influence
of the aid upon the legislature. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 404.
28. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 404.
29. See APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Vol. 2
(1963), REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE INTENT, Vol. 28, No. I, at 25 (1961-63)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
30. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403.
31. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403.
32. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 403-04.
33. See generally Rhodes, supra note 15, at 404. See notes 46-55 and accompanying text
infra.
34. See generally Frankfurter, supra note 2, at 537-38.
35. Rhodes, supra note 15, at 404.
36. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 404. The increasing frequency of a particular crime is an
example of the historical background relevant to the passage of increased penalties for that crime.
See People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514,557, 596 P.2d 328, 352-53, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450,474-75 (1979).
37. See Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907). See generally R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 103-36 (1975).
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attacked the extensive use of legislative history, urging "analysis of the
statute instead of. . . psychoanalysis of Congress."38 Further, an ex-
amination of the context of the aid is imperative in determining the
importance attached to the source by the legislature in shaping a con-
sensus on the statute.3 9 The necessity of discovering the collective
awareness of the legislative, and therefore the effect of the aid on the
legislative process, has been said to depend on the "atmosphere in
which it [the statute] was enacted as derived from circumstances rele-
vant to its evolution .... -40 The opinions or recommendations ex-
posed in the extrinsic materials can assist in the satisfaction of the
context requirement if found to be incorporated in the final version of
the bill.4 '
The preceding discussion suggests a significant overlap in the preced-
ing four elements of the model, even in terms of definition. Every one
of these factors is of singular importance, however, as each contributes
to the total validity of a given extrinsic aid. Moreover, it appears that
the terms themselves imply a "sliding scale" within which each aid
would be analyzed. All of the criteria, then, must be examined to dis-
cover the weight to be given the extrinsic aid in ascertaining its proba-
ble impact on the legislature. While finding a "perfect aid" is not the
goal when examining the various extrinsic sources, more weight should
be given to the source that better meets the preceding criteria of the
model.
The four factors should serve as a starting point for the analysis of
extrinsic aids. The following sections of this comment will focus pri-
marily upon the specific sources of the various aids. One should note
that extrinsic aids themselves do not originate as indicators of legisla-
tive intent. Rather, they are initially promulgated by various sources to
influence or inform the legislature as it considers a particular bill.42
The status of the aid as evidence of legislative intent is always in doubt
38. United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
39. See Rhodes, supra note 15, at 404. See generally White, Sources of Legislative Intent in
California, 3 PAc. L.J. 63, 65 (1972). For example, when the author of a bill writes to the gover-
nor, rather than to a fellow legislator to explain the intent of the legislature in passing the bill, the
California Supreme Court will delineate that evidence as too "remote" to be of use as an indicator
of legislative intent. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 887, 592 P.2d
329, 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 847 (1979). See notes 158-161 and accompanying text infra.
40. de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 529,
550-52 (1940).
41. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 269 U.S. 364, 367 (1928); People v. Wil-
liams, 16 Cal. 3d 663, 667-68, 547 P.2d 1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1976). See generally
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REV. 737, 746-47 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as Jones].
42. Interview with Edgar Kerry, who heads the Legislative Office of the Judicial Council of
California, September 18, 1980 (notes on file at the Pac fc Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Kerry
Interview].
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until the bill is actually enacted into law because the bill may not be
enacted at all. Thereafter, the weight of the aid as evidence of intent
should be determined using the basic model. Because of the flexibility
of the criteria and the possible overlap of the factors, however, any
examination of the various aids must be undertaken with the realiza-
tion that no precise "rating" will result.
ANALYSIS OF EXTRINSIC AIDS UNDER THE MODEL
The various extrinsic aids will be grouped according to their origins
for purposes of this comment. The first set of extrinsic aids considered
will consist of those materials originating from groups outside the legis-
lature. The second type examined will be those aids emanating from
within the legislative process itself and will focus on only three groups
within that process: the Office of Legislative Counsel, the standing
committees, and the legislative offices of research.43 The third set of
extrinsic aids in this analysis concerns individual statements and legis-
lative history.
4. Organizations Outside the Legislature
Many individuals and groups not officially connected with the Cali-
fornia Legislature make proposed changes in the law to a particular
legislator. This legislator will then "carry" the group's bill through
both houses.44 All of these organizations cannot be examined within
the parameters of this comment: consequently, a representative group
of highly visible organizations will be analyzed. Although at least one
commentator contends that these organizations represent a part of leg-
islative history,4 5 this comment will examine these entities emphasizing
their lack of official connection with the California Legislature. The
final organization to be discussed in this section will be the California
Law Revision Commission, which retains aspects of both a private, in-
dependent commission and a dependent legislative entity.
1. The State Bar
The State Bar of California submits yearly recommendations for
43. Although party political caucuses are a substantial part of a legislature's existence, no
formal report guiding "legislative intent" has been found to warrant the inclusion of these groups
into this comment. See notes 17-24 and accompanying text supra.
44. "Carrying" a bill is generally understood by members of the legislature to mean the in-
troducing and shepherding of the bill through the legislative process.
45. See generally, R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
137-97 (1975).
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changes in the law.46 This public corporation,47 through a Board of
Governors and various specialized committees, analyzes the need for
legislation and drafts specific proposals.48 The State Bar is also re-
quired to assist the California Law Revision Commission "in any man-
ner the Commission may request within the scope of its powers or
duties."49
These proposals, as drafted by the State Bar, would presumably be
an accurate reflection of the intent of that entity since all recommenda-
tions are analyzed by its committees and transmitted with each propo-
sal.50 These analyses, however, must be examined individually to
determine whether they are objective enough to satisfy the credibility
element of the model. The requirement of proximity might not be sat-
isfied because the State Bar would seem to be removed from the es-
sence of the legislative process.5' Since the resolutions of the State Bar
are distributed to all of the legislators, these documents are available to
influence the legislature. The context element may then be satisfied.
The contemporaneity element appears to pose the greatest difficulty
because these proposals are promulgated before the legislative session
in which they are introduced.5" Thus, scrutiny must be paid to whether
the legislation as enacted bears a close resemblance to the original pro-
posal. If the bill was not substantially amended before passage the in-
tent of the State Bar arguably is reflected by the legislature when the
bill was enacted."
The task of differentiating a substantial change from a mere cosmetic
change involves evaluating the overall purpose of the bill and the possi-
ble changes in that purpose.54 No recognized test exists for determin-
ing the effect of any particular change on a bill.55 Thus, one should
46. For example, 49 bills were proposed for the 1975 legislative session. See Hufstadler,
Annual Report ofthe Board of Governors, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 607, 619 (1974).
47. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6001.
48. This is in accordance with the Board of Governors' power to "aid in all matters pertain-
ing to the advancement of the science of jurisprudence or to the improvement of the administra-
tion ofjustice .. " Id. §6031. For example, the State Bar proposed the most recent change in
the rape statute to prohibit spousal rape. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1978 CONFERENCE
RESOLUTION 12-3-78.
49. CAL. GOV'T CODE §10307.
50. Committees within the State Bar and the various local bar associations will focus on the
area of their expertise in drafting legislation. See generally STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1979
CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS.
51. For example, the 1979 Conference Resolutions were drafted for use in the 1980 legislative
session on September 15, 16, and 17 of 1979 in Los Angeles. See id. (cover).
52. See note 51 supra.
53. See generally People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 271, 539 P.2d 807, 124 Cal. Rptr. 47
(1975).
54. This is one the basic tenets of statutory construction. See generally Turner v. Board of
Trustees, 16 Cal. 3d 818, 548 P.2d 1115, 129 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976); Clean Air Constituency v.
California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).
55. A bill may sometimes be so amended that it is passed enacting the opposite law desired
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begin with the original State Bar recommendation and examine the
final version of the new law to determine the similarities and differ-
ences between the two; if there exist major differences, the significance
of the comments of the State Bar would be diminished.
2. The Judicial Council
Created in 1926 by constitutional amendment,56 the Judicial Council
performs many functions, including the recommendation of specific
changes in the law through the development and sponsorship of legisla-
tion. 7 The Council is composed of the Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court, who acts as chairperson, one other supreme court jus-
tice, three justices of the courts of appeal, five superior court judges,
three municipal court judges, two justice court judges, four members of
the State Bar, and one member each from the state Senate and Assem-
bly.58 The Council not only makes recommendations in proposal form,
but also analyzes proposed legislation from other sources that affects
the judicial system. 9
The reports and recommendations of the Judicial Council would ap-
pear to be credible because of their explanatory and analytical nature.
Since two of its members are legislators and most of the others are
judges, the proximity element would seem to have been met because of
the closeness of the two legislators to the essence of the legislative proc-
ess. Additionally, context is present at least when a legislative member
sponsors and carries the bill; he or she speaks for the bill as an advocate
of its passage for both the Judicial Council and in his or her capacity as
a legislator.60 Again, the contemporaneity of the bill, focusing on the
differences between the proposal and the enacted legislation as
amended, will contribute to the amount of weight to be given a Judicial
Council report or proposal.
The courts of California recognize the importance of the Judicial
Council in their search for legislative intent. In Hohreiter v. Garrison,6
the First District Court of Appeal was confronted with the task of inter-
by the author. See TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 71-72, discussing a proposal to protect or kill
burros, which, when finally passed, enacted the exact opposite law.
56. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §6; 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §257, at 507 (2d.
ed. 1970); see D. HENKE, CALIFORNIA LAW GUIDE 185-90 (2d. ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
HENKE]. It should be noted that the primary function of the Judicial Council is to administer the
court system of California.
57. The Administrative Office of the Courts, with its director appointed by the Judicial




60. This is true also for most of the State Bar proposals. See note 42 and accompanying text
supra.
61. 81 Cal. App. 2d 384, 184 P.2d 323 (1947).
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preting Government Code Section 11517, which relates to administra-
tive procedure and the powers of an administrative hearing officer.62
The court found that the report of the Judicial Council was "a most
valuable aid in ascertaining the meaning of the statute. '63 Indeed, the
Judicial Council was recognized as "a special legislative committee"
because the Council drafted the act at the request of the legislature.
6
Finally, the court "assumed that the Legislature adopted the proposed
legislation with the intent and meaning expressed by the Council in its
report. 65 Sections of the Council's report were quoted extensively in
the opinion,66 and the court noted no substantial change between the
report and the enacted statute.
67
In Hohreiter, the use of the report of the Judicial Council was appar-
ently correct under the model analysis. The legislature was aware of
the Council's report, and in fact requested that the Council study and
propose new law in this area.68 Thus the report would be in very close
proximity and context to the legislative process. Because the report was
adopted by the legislature without substantial changes, the report
would seem to satisfy the contemporaneity element of the model as
well. Further, while the court did not mention it specifically, the report
was most likely submitted with the proposal, further satisfying the re-
quirement of contemporaneity. 7° Finally, the credibility of the Coun-
cil's report may be inferred from the report's analytical and unbiased
nature, as cited by the Hohrelter court.7 The report of the Judicial
Council, then, was used correctly in the case and in accordance with
the model.
3. The Attorney General
The Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice,72 rec-
ommends changes in the law to the legislature and often analyzes the
potential impact or import of a particular bill.73 Legislative proposals
62. Id. at 392-93, 184 P.2d at 325-26.
63. Id. at 397, 184 P.2d at 331.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 396-97, 184 P.2d at 330-31.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 397, 185 P.2d at 330.
69. See id. at 396, 184 P.2d at 331.
70. This is the usual procedure with reports and recommendations of the Judicial Council to
the legislature. Kerry Interview, supra note 42.
71. See 81 Cal. App. 2d at 397, 184 P.2d at 331.
72. The Attorney General and the Division of Law Enforcement comprise the Department of
Justice. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §15001.
73. Cf. People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 561-67, 596 P.2d 619, 343-46, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450,
465-68 (1979) (appendices D,E,F, and G) (letters from Attorney General to the Senate, the Assem-
bly Criminal Justice Committee, all of the Assembly members, and the Governor, respectively).
See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 181-84.
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by the Attorney General that have been enacted include amendments
to the credit-discrimination laws,7 4 and more recently, the denial of
probation to persons convicted of using firearms while committing
specified felonies,75 which was the source of the famous People v. Tan-
ner decisions.76
Under the model analysis, the promulgation of legislative materials
by the Attorney General reflects the possibility of bias affecting his or
her credibility because it is the duty of the Attorney General to enforce
the law, but not to enact it.77 Because of this primary duty to enforce
the law and the remoteness from the essence of the legislative process,
the Attorney General's recommendations and opinions may also be
suspect in the proximity area. The date of the source and the degree of
change undergone by the bill subsequent to the recommendation or
opinion must be examined closely to determine its contemporaneity
and its continued vitality. The context element may be met if the
source is actually available to the individual legislators. Overall, how-
ever, the Attorney General's office would appear to be a questionable
source of legislative intent, given the problems raised by the credibiity
and proximity factors of the model.7"
4. The Calfornia Law Revision Commission
The California Law Revision Commission, which replaced the old
Code Commission" in 1953,1° includes among its duties the recom-
mendation of reforms that the legislature deems necessary. 8' The
Commission includes one state senator and one assembly member, with
gubernatorial appointees comprising the rest of the body."2 When a
major revision of the law is proposed, a study of the area must be con-
ducted; such a study must be authorized by a concurrent resolution in
the legislature.83 The legislature thus controls the topics to be reviewed
and analyzed by the Law Revision Commission. This organization ap-
pears to be independent in the scope of its recommendations; the legis-
lature does not always agree with the Commission's
recommendations.84 Still, the legislative record of the Commission is
74. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1812.30.
75. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.06.
76. See text accompanying notes 178-209 infra.
77. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 181-84.
78. Further discussion of the Attorney General's opinions and recommendations will take
place in the analysis of People v. Tanner. See text accompanying notes 194-200 infra.
79. See CAL. STATS. 1929, c. 750, §2, at 1427-28.
80. See CAL. STATS. 1953, c. 1445, § 2 at 3036; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§10300-10340.
81. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §10300. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 192-93.
82. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §10301.
83. Id. §10335.
84. For example, the Commission has been active in the reform of California's non-profit
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phenomonal; as of the 1979 legislative session, 102 of the 114 bills pro-
posed by the Law Revision Commission, or 90 percent, were enacted in
whole or in substantial part."
The credibility of the Law Revision Commission appears to be re-
flected fairly in the analytical nature of its reports and its record of
impact in the legislature.8 6 Likewise, proximity is achieved by the leg-
islative membership on the Commission and legislative control of the
Commission's activities. Contemporaneity is found in the lack of sub-
stantial change that usually occurs in a bill recommended by the Com-
mission, although this absence of change does not take place on every
recommended bill. The reports and recommendations are usually pub-
lished in conjunction with the bill and subsequent statute when it is
enacted, and every legislator has a copy of these materials. Thus, the
context element of availability is satisfied.
California courts have generally depended heavily on the Law Revi-
sion Commission materials, when available, for evidence of legislative
intent.87 In fact, the California Supreme Court has stated that the
Commission's comments were the intent of the legislature. 88 Further,
the United States Supreme Court has used the official commentary of
the Law Revision Commission to find a section of the California Evi-
dence Code the "considered choice by the California legislature."89
When the legislature does not change the language of a section pro-
posed by the Commission, the Commission's comments are at the very
least a strong indication of legislative intent.90 Because of its credibil-
ity, its legislative roots, and its past record, the California Law Revision
Commission may be the best indicator of legislative intent outside the
chambers of the legislature.
Other organizations too numerous to mention recommend legislation
and give opinions regarding legislative action. These groups, including
state agencies and departments, labor unions, trade associations, and
other special interest groups91 will also require an analysis under the
model. Generally, however, if a particular bias can be shown regarding
the organization's analysis of a bill the credibility of that organization
can be challenged. Further, a substantially amended bill may cause a
corporation law. See 13 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUD-
'Es 2201 (1976).
85. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 210 (1978).
86. See id. See note 84 supra.
87. See Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 249, 437 P.2d 508 511 (1968).
88. See People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d 663, 667-68, 547 P.2d 1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888,
891 (1976).
89. California v. Green, 339 U.S. 149, 154 (1970).
90. See Mann v. State, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 778-79, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (1977).
91. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 196-223; Steck, California Legislation: Sources
Unlimited, 6 PAC. L. J. 536, 560-63 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Steck].
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group's analysis to lose its contemporaneity. Thus each group must be
examined using all of the four proposed criteria to gauge the recom-
mendations and opinions in terms of their worth as extrinsic aids in the
determination of legislative intent.
B. Entities Within the Legislature. Legislative Committees, the
Legislative Counsel, and the Offices of Research
The legislative committees, the Legislative Counsel, and the Senate
and Assembly Offices of Research in the respective legislative bodies
are integral parts of the legislative process. Their work is immediately
available to individual legislators; indeed, these organizations are com-
prised either of legislators themselves or of persons who report directly
to legislators. In addition to these attributes, two of these entities, the
Legislative Counsel and the committees, are being cited extensively by
California courts today as indicators of legislative intent.92 These orga-
nizations must be examined under the model to determine their worth
as extrinsic aids to the process of finding legislative intent.
L Legislative Committees
Legislative committees often do the majority of the work in formu-
lating amendments to proposed legislation in California,93 as well as in
most other states94 and the United States Congress. 95 Because a com-
mittee presumably has specialized knowledge and expertise,96 a legisla-
tive body usually defers to the findings and recommendations of a
committee. The various committees have staff consultants who prepare
analyses of each bill that are circulated within the committee prior to
its consideration of the bill. These analyses frequently note possible
problem areas with the bill, propose changes to correct those problems,
and include an opinion regarding the changes that the bill will bring
about.
97
These committee analyses are clearly proximate in origin to the legis-
92. See People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 520, 596 P.2d 328, 330-31, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450, 452-
53 (1979); Pieri v. Fox, 96 Cal. App. 3d 802, 808, 158 Cal. Rptr. 256, 260 (1978); Lewis v. Ryan, 64
Cal. App. 3d 330, 335, 134 Cal. Rptr. 355, 357-58 (1976). But see Stewart v. Board of Medical
Quality Assurance, 80 Cal. App. 3d 172, 183, 143 Cal. Rptr. 641, 647 (1978); Evans v. City of
Orange, 208 Cal. App. 2d 516, 528-29, 25 Cal. Rptr. 373, 381-82 (1962).
93. See Steck, supra note 91, at 557-58.
94. See generally Rhodes, supra note 15 (Florida); Johnstone, The Use oExtrinsic Aids to
Statutory Construction in Oregon. 29 OR. L. REv. 1 (1949) (Oregon); Comment, Statutory Con.
struction - Legislative Intent - Use of Extrinsic Aids in Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 660 (1964)
(Wisconsin).
95. See generally Jones, supra note 41; de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation cf
Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (1940).
96. See generaly Jones, supra note 41.
97. A committee analysis report was included in the decision of the Tanner case. See notes
178-209 and accompanying text infra.
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lative process. The potential aids must be examined then in terms of
their contemporaneity: does the analysis concern a bill that has not
been acted upon for a substantial period of time?98 Another relevant
inquiry regarding this element is whether the bill has been substantially
amended later in other committees or by either house of the legislature;
a past committee analysis of a subsequently amended bill may be use-
ful to a court only for limited provisions of the bill. A key inquiry in
the investigation of credibility concerns the scope of the analysis. Of
particular relevance is the determination of whether the analysis is cur-
sory as opposed to a fully developed in-depth analysis of the provisions
of the bill. The analytical and unbiased nature of the bill analysis
should likewise be examined thoroughly to ascertain its credibility.99
The context of the analyses and the fact that these analyses are not
generally circulated and used by all members of the legislature appear
to diminish the potential evidentiary value to be gained from this
source.'00 The committees of the California Legislature usually report
out a bill with the notation "do pass" or "do pass as amended" and
nothing else.' 0 ' No reports on the merits of the bill accompany the
proposed legislation explaining the committee's actions.' 02
An example of the use of a legislative committee analysis as a source
of legislative intent is found in the case of Southern California Gas
Company v. Public Utilities Commission.103 The statute under scrutiny
by the California Supreme Court concerned the implementation of
home insulation financing programs by utility companies. 1°4 At issue
was whether the provisions challenged were permissive or required by
the terms of the statute. 0 5 The court used two committee analyses to
decide that the programs were permissive, with the justification that
"[s]tatements in legislative committee reports concerning the statutory
objects and purposes which are in accord with a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute are legitimate aids in determining legislative in-
tent."'10 6 The court's approval of the use of the committee reports
under this cursory examination under any perceived guidelines makes
98. It should be noted that the time span may have been caused by any number of factors,
including the postponement of a bill over to the next legislative session. Other questions concern-
ing the bill may have arisen in this intervening period also.
99. Bias should be examined in certain cases also; for example, when the author of the bil is
also the chairperson of the committee, the analysis of that committee may not be as neutral as an
uninterested committee performing the same task. Additionally, analyses may vary from commit-
tee to committee, and some reports may not be strictly analytical. Kerry Interview, supra note 42.
100. Kerry Interview, supra note 42.
101. See REPORT, supra note 29, at 10.
102. See REPORT, supra note 29, at 10. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 162-69.
103. 24 Cal. 3d 653, 596 P.2d 1149, 156 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979).
104. Id. at 655-56, 596 P.2d at 1150, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 659, 596 P.2d at 1152, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
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it readily apparent that the model analysis could have been employed
profitably in the case.
The committees of the California Legislature also issue formal re-
ports on various topics, including proposed legislation that is before the
committee.10 7 While formal committee reports have been suggested as
a useful additional source of legislative intent, 0 8 such formal reports
tend to be issued rather infrequently. 0 9 When available, such formal
reports would be credible because of their analytical nature. Likewise,
a formal report submitted to the legislature more fully meets the con-
text element than the usual committee analysis because its publication
in the Assembly or Senate Journals increases its availability to the indi-
vidual legislators."t 0 The report, if published during the legislative
process, must be examined in light of subsequent amendments to the
bill which may destroy the contemporaneity of the report. The proxim-
ity of the report is established by the nature of the legislative committee
as a part of the legislature. Because these factors may be more fully
realized in the context of a formal committee report, the legislature
might be inclined to adopt this type of reporting system to better publi-
cize its reasoning to those interpreting statutes.
2. The Legislative Counsel
The Office of the Legislative Counsel, like the committees of the leg-
islature, is a significant force in the shaping of California legislation."'I
Created in 1913,112 the Legislative Counsel is charged with the duties of
preparing legislation and assisting lawmakers in the initial drafting
phase of the legislative process,' ' 3 as well as rendering legal opinions
on proposed legislation upon a legislator's request." 4 The Legislative
Counsel also publishes a short synopsis or analysis of every bill as it is
107. See REPORT, supra note 29, at 45.
108. In fact, the Report of the 1963 Assembly Subcommittee on Legislative Intent recom-
mended the "[a]doption of a system of standing committee reports, beginning with one or two
committees on a trial basis .... " REPORT, supra note 29, at 45. The legislature has not at-
tempted to adopt such a system as yet.
109. The California legislature has created many and varied committees and subcommittees
that work on a wide range of subjects. Their findings and recommendations sometimes are pub-
lished in the respective legislative journals. See HENKE, supra note 56, at 160-61. These "report-
ing" committees handle the larger problems. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
generally considers the Congressional committees as the "real" legislature on the strength of the
committee reports, and, a fortiori, the intent of the committee is the intent of Congress, See
O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 269 U.S. 364, 367 (1926). See generally Jones, supra note
41, at 746-50.
110. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
I 11. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 184-85; Dutton, The Quantity of Leglslation in
California, 29 CAL. ST. B.J. 67, 69 (1954); Steck, supra note 91, at 555-57.
112. See CAL. STATS. 1913, c. 322, §1, at 626; CAL. GOV'T CODE §10200.
113. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§10207, 10231, 10233.
114. Individual opinions to legislators, however, are not publicly released unless the legislator
chooses to release them. Id. §§10207, 10233. See Steck, supra note 91, at 556.
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introduced or amended, called the Legislative Counsel's Digest, which
precedes the text of every bill.1 5 The Legislative Counsel is also
charged with other duties, such as assisting the drafters of initiative
measures to be submitted to the voters," 6 and advising the legislature
of legislation needed to maintain a particular code or to codify a cer-
tain public policy." 7
The opinions of the Legislative Counsel's office to an individual leg-
islator are protected by the attorney-client privilege and are not pub-
lished unless the legislator chooses to release the opinion."18 Thus,
these opinions may not be available to form a basis for legislative in-
tent. Without the release and publication of a Legislative Counsel
opinion normally only one legislator is aware of its contents and the
opinion cannot influence other legislators. Because of their explana-
tory and unbiased nature, the opinions would appear to be credible. " 9
Proximity of these opinions is assumed because of the closeness of the
Legislative Counsel to the essence of the legislative process. The opin-
ions may not be contemporaneous, however, unless the individual
lawmaker chooses to release the opinion during the consideration of
the bill by the legislature.'
20
While the "private" opinions of the Legislature Counsel are gener-
ally unavailable, the Legislative Counsel's Digest is readily accessible
to all members of the legislature. If the legislator reads the bill, he or
she is likely to read the digest as well.' 2 1 Thus the context element is
apparently satisfied. Since the digest is prepared and released in con-
junction with every new or amended bill, it would appear to be con-
temporaneous also. The possibility exists, however, that an
overworked Legislative Counsel staff may be "much too busy during
the final hectic days of that legislative session"'122 to reword the digest
thoroughly and carefully to reflect accurately the changed intent in the
last-minute amendments, thus detracting from the credibility and con-
temporaneity of this source. Because of its analytical and apolitical
background, the digest is credible.' 23 The Legislative Counsel's Digest,
115. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1980 HANDBOOK, TEMPORARY JOINT RULES OF THE SENATE
AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 8.5, at 325.
116. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §10243.
117. See id. §10242.
118. Id. §10207. See note 114 supra.
119. See generaly Dutton, The Quantity ofLegislation in California, 29 CAL. ST. B.J. 67, 69
(1954).
120. This course of action has been encouraged by at least one commentator, see Steck, supra
note 91 at 546, but it appears to have been ignored by California legislators.
121. Kerry Interview, supra note 42.
122. People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 542, 596 P.2d 328, 345, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450, 467 (1979)
(Newman, J., concurring).
123. See text accompanying notes 111-119 supra. See generally REPORT, supra note 29, at 46;
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then, appears to be a potentially viable extrinsic aid under the model.
The Legislative Counsel's Digest has been used frequently by Cali-
fornia courts to discern evidence of legislative intent."2 4 The digest
analysis has even been used as evidence to imply the refusal of the
legislature to enter a peripheral area of the law not covered by that
analysis.' 2 5 This reliance of the courts upon the digest seems war-
ranted, given the strong showing made by this source under the model.
3. The Offices of Research
Largely information disseminators,2 6 the Senate and Assembly Of-
fices of Research assist their respective houses by analyzing amend-
ments made in the other house, focusing on the differences between the
final versions of the bill as passed by each legislative house.' 27 The
Assembly Office of Research, for example, is required to prepare an
analysis of each bill amended in the Senate or on the third reading file,
and place this analysis "upon the desks of the Members . . .28
While not required to analyze every bill, the Senate Office of Research
has the duty to assist its members in this area also.'
2 9
Under the model analysis, the offices of research are credible because
of their analytical and unbiased nature. 30 Further, these entities ap-
pear to be in close proximity to the essence of the legislative process.
The analyses promulgated by these research bodies, however, must be
examined with care to determine their contemporaneity to the decision
of the legislature. The only time that a legislator would have a research
office analysis on his or her desk would be immediately prior to a final
vote on a bill. This analysis may not be useful to a legislator who has
already decided which way to vote on the proposed statute. Conse-
quently, some or all of the legislators will not be influenced at all by the
analysis, although it is available to them. Finally, this availability sat-
isfies the context element of the model. Thus, although the bill analy-
ses of the offices of research may be produced late in the legislative
Crotty, New Legislation-4 Constructive Suggestion, 28 CAL. ST. B.J. 42, 48-51 (1953); Steck,
supra note 91, at 555.
124. See Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 443, 556 P.2d 1101, 1115, 134 Cal. Rptr.
650, 664 (1976). See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
125. See People v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 428, 434, 595 P.2d 139, 141, 155 Cal. Rptr. 704,
707 (1979). The California Supreme Court maintained that it was "reasonable to presume that the
Legislature amended those sections with the intent and meaning expressed in the Legislative
Counsel's digest."
126. Interview with Dorothy Graham, Librarian for Assembly Office of Research, Sept. 19,
1980 (notes on file at the Pacoc Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Graham Interview].
127. Graham Interview, supra note 126. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 172-74.
128. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1980 HANDBOOK, STANDING RULES OF THE AssEMBLY, Rule
68.6, at 272-73; Graham Interview, supra note 126.
129. Graham Interview, supra note 126.
130. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 173.
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process, these analyses may be an effective tool for the courts in deter-
mining the intent of at least one house of the California Legislature in
enacting a statute.
13
C. Legislative History and Individual Statements
Legislative history is maligned by some who criticize the tendencies-
of some courts to "rummage in the ash cans of the legislative proc-
ess," 1 32 but it is generally considered a valid source of legislative in-
tent. 33 Many potential sources of legislative history exist;' 3 4 the courts
have examined statements by legislators, 35 members of the executive
branch, 36 and witnesses appearing before legislative committees 37 to
assist them in determining the intent of the legislature. Legislative his-
tory and individual statements, then, must be analyzed using the four
elements of the model.
L Legislative History
Justice Holmes once said that it was "a delicate business to base
speculations about the purposes or construction of a statute upon the
vicissitudes of its passage."' 138 Previous drafts of a bill arguably affect
the final version of the bill 13 9 but may lack credibility because, while
they are unbiased, they are also non-analytical in nature. These prior
bills are not contemporaneous either since the prior versions of the bill
are no longer under legislative consideration. Although clearly proxi-
mate to the legislative process, previously amended bills also encounter
difficulty in the area of context, particularly with the inquiry into the
effect of the prior bill on the subsequently enacted version. Again,
since an individual legislator will only vote on the most recent
amended version of a bill, the preceding drafts may not have an oppor-
tunity to affect his or her decision at all.
While California courts maintain that legislative history can not
131. Graham Interview, supra note 126. Neither Ms. Graham nor the author know of any
California cases citing to the offices of research.
132. C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 52 (1954).
133. See People v. Yoshimura, 62 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415, 133 Cal. Rptr. 228, 231 (1976). See
generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 137-97 (1975);
HENKE, supra note 56, at 155-58; SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at §§48.01-48.18.
134. See notes 92-131 and accompanying text supra.
135. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 590, 546 P.2d 1371, 1374-75, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 427, 430-31 (1976).
136. See People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 520, 596 P.2d 328, 331, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450, 453
(1979).
137. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 888-89, 592 P.2d 329, 334-35,
153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 847-48 (1979); Pennisi v. Fish & Game Dep't, 97 Cal. App. 3d 268, 273-74, 158
Cal. Rptr. 683, 686-87 (1979). See text accompanying notes 148-163 infra.
138. Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922).
139. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 155-58.
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override the unequivocal language of a statute 40 and that unpassed
bills usually have little value, 14 1 they have also recognized that pro-
posed legislative drafts "may be helpful" to discovering legislative in-
tent. 42  In some cases, the appellate courts have decided that the
specific prior rejection by the legislature of a provision that is now
sought to be included judicially into the statute may be persuasive in a
decision to omit the provision.' 43 These particular decisions may be
the only reasonable use for legislative history under the model's analy-
sis since previous bills would arguably shed light only on what the leg-
islature did not intend to pass. 4"
2. Individual Statements
Courts have often examined the statements of individuals as another
part of legislative history, whether they are statements from outside the
legislature, 45 statements by individual legislators, 46 or executive
messages concerning the enactment of the new law. 147 It then becomes
necessary to examine the statements made under varied circumstances
utilizing the model analysis.
a. Committee Testimony
The testimony of a witness before a legislative committee is one ex-
ample of an individual statement used as an aid in deciphering legisla-
tive intent. Two recent cases dealing with individual statements as a
part of legislative history reflect the haphazard approach of the Califor-
nia courts in permitting the introduction of such evidence. In Pennisi v.
Fish and Game Department,14 1 the First District Court of Appeal per-
mitted the trial testimony of persons charged with administering a new
statute dealing with the appropriate size of commercial fishing nets. "
49
140. See Estate of Wannamaker, 65 Cal. App. 3d 587, 593, 135 Cal. Rptr. 333, 336 (1977).
141. See Miles v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 243, 248 n.4, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 508, 511 n.4 (1977); Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 19, 120 Cal. Rptr.
233, 247 (1975); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 57-58, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (1968).
142. See 67 Cal. App. 3d at 248, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
143. See Madrid v. Justice Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 819, 825, 125 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (1975).
See generally People v. Adams, 59 Cal. App. 3d 559, 131 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1976); SUTHERLAND,
supra note 9.
144. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 155-58.
145. See notes 158-161 and accompanying text infra.
146. See notes 164-177 and accompanying text infra. For example, a legislator may make a
statement regarding his or her intent in introducing the bill and the changes that he or she believes
will take place under the new law. If the statement is made during the last committee hearing for
the bill before it is enacted, that statement would be much more proximate than the identical
statement made to a civic club meeting in the legislator's district the night before.
147. See notes 190-193 and accompanying text infra.
148. 97 Cal. App. 3d 268, 158 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1979).
149. ld. at 273-75, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
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Both the present and former directors of the Fish and Game Depart-
ment testified at trial that the law sought to be enforced against the
plaintiff had not been altered by a subsequent enactment closely related
to it.'50 The present director had also testified at the legislative com-
mittee hearing on the bill. 5 ' The statements on appeal were found by
the court to be relevant evidence of contemporaneous administrative
construction which, as a rule of statutory interpretation, are entitled to
great weight in determining legislative intent.'52 The court concluded
that the trial judge was "duty bound to admit the challenged extrinsic
evidence to ascertain the true intent of the legislature and to effectuate
the purpose of the law."' 53
The directors' statements both at trial and at the legislative hearing
may have been biased in favor of their interpretation and hence not
credible under the model analysis. These two persons were the officials
charged with carrying out the law; it even appears that one of the direc-
tors assisted in the drafting of the legislation.'54 If the director's state-
ment at the committee hearing -was contemporaneous with the
enactment-that is, the legislature subsequently passed the bill substan-
tially intact in a fairly short period of time, the statements at the trial
would be mere recitals of past testimony and therefore evidence of
prior administrative construction. The committee testimony was in
proximity to the legislative process since it took place during the con-
sideration of the bill by the legislature. Context, however, presents the
problem of whether sufficient numbers of legislators actually were
aware that the administrative agency had construed the previous stat-
ute in the same manner. Since the committee hearing report was pub-
lished after the passage of the bill, 55 only word-of-mouth
communication among those members present at the hearing and other
legislators could have been responsible for any effect the statement may
have caused. Furthermore, the statements themselves, like the ensuing
report, were not available to all of the legislators. Thus, the statements
appear to be deficient in their context as well as in their contemporane-
ity. As evidence of administrative construction, their use was arguably
proper; as proof of legislative intent, however, these statements not ac-
150. Id. at 273-74, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 273-75, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87; see FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391
(1959); People v. McGee, 19 Cal. 3d 948, 961, 568 P.2d 382, 388, 140 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663 (1977).
153. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
154. See id. at 273-74 n.4, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 686 n.4. Motive here may be discussed, but both
the directors were state officials who were arguably explaining this particular legislation. See text
accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
155. AB 574 became Chapter 136 on June 30, 1973. The committee report was published for
general circulation approximately two weeks later.
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tually affecting the shaping of legislative intent should have been given
little weight. Although there is some authority to the contrary, 5 6 most
courts will not admit the statements of individuals testifying before a
legislative committee.'57
California, however, has found even legislative inaction after com-
mittee testimony to be evidence that the new law should be construed
in a given manner. In Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior
Court,'58 the California Supreme Court, in construing the Unfair Prac-
tices Act relating to insurance companies and third parties, concluded
that a statement by an Insurance Department official at the committee
hearing that the bill "could be construed to affect third parties"'159 was
admissible in evidence to prove legislative intent. This testimony, plus
the failure of the legislature to amend the bill afterward, constituted "a
reasonable implication that third party claimants were to enjoy the pro-
tection afforded by the bill."'60 Thus, this lack of action by the legisla-
ture was transformed by the court into an affirmative statement of
legislative intent. Legislative inaction, however, at least in Royal
Globe, would make such a statement too much of a "slim reed upon
which to lean in determining legislative intent."' 61
In essence, all individual statements purporting to embody total leg-
islative intent are contradictions in terms. The only time that an indi-
vidual may be reasonably sure that all the legislators are aware of a
statement is if the individual is also a legislator and the statement is
made during a floor debate. Statements made by legislators during
floor debates, however, are almost universally discarded by modem
courts because of the political nature of these debates; 62 further, de-
bates in the California Legislature are never officially recorded.1
63
b. Communications from the Author of a Bill
Statements by legislators have been allowed as evidence of legislative
intent by California courts in recent cases. In the case of In re Marriage
of Bouquet, 164 the California Supreme Court was confronted with the
156. See Jones, supra note 41, at 744.
157. See generall, SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at §48.10.
158. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978).
159. Id. at 888, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
160. Id. at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
161. Quinn v. State, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 175, 539 P.2d 761, 768, 124 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1975).
162. See Carmona v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303, 311, 530 P.2d 161, 166, 118
Cal. Rptr. 473, 478 (1975); In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 327, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (1935). But see Kay
v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (senator's remark about a bill has "some weight" as
being an "unchallenged comtemporaneous construction" of the proposed law). See generally
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1972); SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at §48.13.
163. See generally HENKE, supra note 56, at 138.
164. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
1980 / Legislative Intent
issue of possible retroactivity of a community property statute. The
author of the bill, an Assembly member, had sent a letter to the Presi-
dent Pro Tempore of the Senate that was subsequently incorporated
into the Senate Journal, 65 stating that the bill should apply retroac-
tively. 66 The court held that the statute was retroactive, relying on the
letter on two levels.
The letter, although containing the personal views of the Assembly
member, was said to be "quite relevant to the extent that it evidences
the understanding of the Legislature as a whole."' 6 7 The Supreme
Court adopted a test indicating that the testimony or statement of a
bill's author must 1) not express the author's own opinion of the bill,
and 2) be a mere recital of the events transpiring during the legislative
process. 168 Finding legislative intent in the letter, the court ultimately
held that the provisions would be applied retroactively. 69 An exami-
nation under the model, however, reveals the basis of the opinion to be
questionable.
Given that the author's statement is in close proximity to the legisla-
tive process, the other three factors of the model must be applied. Al-
though there is a great potential for bias here, the Assembly member's
account of the path of the bill to enactment is arguably credible be-
cause it is analytical in nature. The letter in Bouquet, however, was not
published until after the effective date of the amendment. The letter
thus appears to be neither comtemporaneous nor in the proper context
of a reasonably acceptable extrinsic aid, because it had no opportunity
to sway opinions or votes on the legislation. Although the Bouquet
court admitted the letter as evidence of legislative intent, the letter's
publication subsequent to the legislative process would probably make
its effect on the other legislators minimal or nonexistent.
The use of these "elements" of the test may have been an attempt to
legitimize the finding of the court. It is arguably very difficult for legis-
lators to refrain from expressing their personal opinions about bills that
they have authored in an attempt to secure the enactment of these bills.
The second level of the case deals with the motion of the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate to print, and the subsequent printing of the
letter from the Assembly member. The senator offered the letter as a
"letter of legislative intent."' 70 This expostfacto effort to create legis-
165. Id. at 589, 546 P.2d at 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id at 590, 546 P.2d at 1375, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 431; see Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry, 235
Cal. App. 2d 591, 603-04, 45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 520 (1965).
169. 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
170. Id. at 589, 546 P.2d at 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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lative intent, published after the bill was enacted, appears to be an at-
tempt to manufacture legislative intent where there may not have been
any. Any aid promulgated after the enactment of a bill would seem to
lose contemporaneity according to the model, as well as any actual
ability to be present in the minds of the legislators. And by occurring
after passage, the statement contributes nothing in the way of assistance
to legislators who have already made up their minds; thus there would
arguably be a problem with the context factor in the model. Whether
the author is credible or not will, of course, depend largely on who he
or she is and in what esteem he or she is held by the legislature. While
the President Pro Tempore is in close proximity to the legislature,
problems with the other three elements that exist with a subsequent
"expression of intent" outweigh this factor. The opportunities for
abuse in this area are apparent. '7 1 If subsequent expressions of legisla-
tive intent are relevant to an understanding by the legislature,172 then
the possibility exists that additional resolutions or letters may lead to
an erroneous construction of new law.
73
Individual statements, particularly those made by the author of the
bill, are used by the California courts almost whimsically at times. One
case will state that an author's trial testimony is "some indication" of
legislative intent; 74 another case will set up requirements for the indi-
vidual's statement to be admitted; 75 still another opinion will flatly re-
fuse to consider the introduction of a letter by the author of the bill as
evidence of intent; 76 yet another decision will admit these types of let-
ters to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 77 While courts have often
relied on individual statements as evidence of legislative intent, a care-
ful analysis under this model is necessary to determine the relative
weight to be given to that evidence.
A good example of the use and misuse of individual statements, as
171. It is often agreed by all interested parties that a letter should be placed in the Journal to
clarify the particular meaning of a word or phrase. Suppose, however, that a senator's favorite bill
has just had the crucial language (that would have accomplished exactly what the senator wanted
accomplished) amended out by a committee. The senator is very anxious to have the provision in
the bill, so when the bill passes to the assembly, the senator writes a letter to a friendly assembly
member, and asks him or her to introduce it into the Assembly Journal as a "letter of legislative
intent". The letter is routinely printed, the bill is not substantially changed, and the result under
Bouquet is the same whether or not the desiredpro vision actuallypassed the legislature. See gener-
ally F. NEWMAN & S. SURREY, LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 158-59 (1955).
172. See 16 Cal. 3d at 589, 546 P.2d at 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
173. See TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 36-39. The Report of the assembly subcommittee
recommended that no individual statements by the author of a bill be used or printed. See RE-
PORT, supra note 27, at 43.
174. See Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners, 53 Cal. App. 3d 283, 285-86, 125 Cal. Rptr.
694, 695-96 (1975).
175. See Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry, 235 Cal. App. 2d 591, 603-04,45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 520
(1965).
176. See Bragg v. City of Auburn, 253 Cal. App. 2d 50, 54, 61 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288 (1967).
177. See notes 194-200 and accompanying text infra.
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well as other extrinsic aids, in determining legislative intent can be seen
in the recent case of People v. Tanner.
PEOPLE V. TANNER: USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS RUNS AMOK?
The California Supreme Court found evidence of legislative intent
from a plethora of extrinsic aids in the decision on rehearing of People
v. Tanner.178 At issue was the interpretation of California Penal Code
Section 1203.06, which on its face appears to forbid the judicial grant-
ing of probation to any defendant convicted of a felony in which a
firearm is used.' 79 Tanner was convicted of armed robbery, and the
trial judge granted him probation. The state subsequently appealed,
arguing that Section 1203.06 allowed no exceptions to the provision.
The Legislative Counsel's digest, a senate committee staff analysis,
the governor's press release after the enactment of the bill, an opposi-
tion letter sent to the governor and three legislators by the Northern
California Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and foir
letters sent by the Attorney General to the legislators and the governor
were deemed "pertinent and timely expression[s] of legislative intent
existing when Section 1203.06 was enacted."' 80 The press release, the
Legislative Counsel's digest, and the senate committee staff analysis
were used in Justice Clark's majority opinion,' 8' with the opposition
letter by the ACLU being cited in a footnote in that opinion. All of
these sources, with the exception of the digest, were also appended to
the decision.' The three documents cited in the text of the majority
opinion will be analysed initially.
Under the model, the Legislative Counsel's digest would ordinarily
represent a potentially helpful extrinsic aid. 83 As Justice Newman
pointed out in his concurring opinion, however, the digest remained the
same throughout a period during which several substantial changes
were made in the bill. ' 84 Whatever the reason for the digest remaining
the same,185 it was arguably no longer contemporaneous with the bill it
sought to analyze. Thus, the court may have erred in relying upon the
digest to the degree evidenced in the opinion.
The bill analysis prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee was
apparently used by the majority to bolster the evidentiary value given
to the Legislative Counsel's digest.' 86 Here, the substance of the
178. 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
179. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.06.
180. 24 Cal. 3d at 520, 596 P.2d at 330, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
181. Id. at 520, 596 P.2d at 330-31, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 452-53.
182. Id. at 551-67, 596 P.2d at 339-46, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 461-68.
183. See notes 111-125 and accompanying text supra.
184. See 24 Cal. 3d at 540-42, 596 P.2d at 345, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (Newman, J., concurring).
185. See id. at 540, 596 P.2d at 345, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (Newman, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 520, 596 P.2d at 331, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
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anlaysis was examined and Justice Newman found "the writer of the
Senate committee memo, like the Legislative Counsel, was concerned with
§ 1203 on,."'87 Further, the analysis by the senate committee does not
indicate that anyone on the committee, including the staff, had any
knowledge of or any concern for any other Penal Code section allowing
probation.188 The implication would seem to be that the legislature
passed the bill without knowledge of the other sections relating to pro-
bation, which in turn would diminish the significance of the senate
committee staff memo. Like the Legislative Counsel's digest, the analy-
sis does not take into account the subsequent amendments to the bill;
189
it may therefore lack contemporaneity also.
Executive messages to the legislature have occasionally been used to
construe a particular piece of legislation, although not in California. t90
In Tanner, however, the governor's message included by the court as
evidence of legislative intent was a press release, not a message to the
legislature. 19' A press release upon the signing of a bill evidences only
the governor's belief in the meaning of the bill, not that of the legisla-
ture. The press release was published after the bill was passed; thus it
could not be contemporaneous. Further, context is lacking since this
subsequent source was unavailable to affect the vote on the bill in any
way whatsoever. The press release may also be suspect under a credi-
bility analysis because of bias; since the bill had been passed already,
there was arguably no need to inform the legislature about legislative
intent. While the press release is somewhat proximate to the legislative
process, this proposed extrinsic aid probably should not have been used
by the Tanner court. Indeed, Justice Newman noted that the gover-
nor's press release did not evidence any knowledge of the crucial
phrase of the newly enacted law.192 As Professor Sutherland wrote,
"[w]hether a message (by the executive) addressed to someone other
than the legislature should be considered depends on whether it is rea-
sonable to believe that the legislature knew about it."'
93
The Tanner court also found legislative intent in letters written to the
legislators by then Attorney General Evelle Younger. 94 While it is a
187. Id. at 543, 596 P.2d at 346, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
188. Id. (Newman, J., concurring). See generally Comment, The California Judiciary and
Mandatory Sentencing: Is the Power to Sentence Inherent or Inherited?, II PAC. L. J. 95 (1974).
189. 24 Cal. 3d at 543, 596 P.2d at 346, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (Newman, J., concurring).
190. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 710 (1946). Executive messages, including veto
messages and proclamations, are regularly printed in the respective legislative journals. See
HENKE, supra note 56, at 180.
191. See 24 Cal. 3d at 520, 596 P.2d at 331, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
192. Id. at 543, 596 P.2d at 346, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (Newman, J., concurring).
193. SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at §48.05.
194. Cf. 24 Cal. 3d at 561-67, 596 P.2d at 350-57, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 472-79 (letters of the
Attorney General reprinted in annexes D-G).
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fact that the Attorney General did draft the bill,'95 the letters of the
Attorney General regarding a bill constantly amended throughout its
legislative history were used by the court. These letters, which were
written to both assembly and senate members, 96 are perhaps an excel-
lent indication of what the Attorney General thought the legislature
intended to do at the time of the introduction of the bill. The letters are
not dispositive, however, of the legislators' feelings toward the bill
eventually enacted. As discussed earlier, 9 7 opinions of the Attorney
General must be scrutinized as an extrinsic aid in terms of contempora-
neity once a bill is amended. The final two letters were sent by the
Attorney General after passage of the bill by at least one house. 1 98 Al-
though the Attorney General made it clear that the legislative history
of the bill was known to him and that he still supported the legisla-
tion, 199 his letters represent just another outside analysis of the bill, al-
beit a well-reasoned and insightful one that was of some influence in
the legislature. Proximity to the essence of the legislative process is still
not achieved, therefore. The context-element is satisfied by the influ-
ence known to be exerted by the Attorney General and his staff on
behalf of the bill.2" Thus, the Attorney General's letters represent an
analysis of a bill by an outside source that may not have been proxi-
mate or contemporaneous with the legislative process; the Tanner court
may have mistakenly admitted this evidence of legislative intent also.
Finally, the majority opinion cites to an opposition letter by the
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ACLU). Although this reference is contained in a footnote
in the opinion,2 ' the text of the letter nonetheless is appended to the
case, possibly as further evidence of the understanding of all the parties
concerning the bill.2" 2 The court notes that the letter is "[i]llustrative of
legislative intent"20 3 although the letter was written only to the gover-
nor and three legislators. 2°4 The letter would appear to lack sufficient
context with the legislative process to establish the ideas expressed
therein. The ACLU letter also may fail under the proximity test since
the ACLU, absent heavy lobbying efforts on its part, would seem to be
removed from the essence of the legislative process. Further, the
195. Id. at 551, 596 P.2d at 339, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
196. See id. at 561-67, 596 P.2d at 343-46, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 465-68.
197. See notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
198. See 24 Cal. 3d at 545-46, 596 P.2d at 347-48, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70 (Newman, J.,
concurring).
199. See Id. at 561-68, 596 P.2d at 354-57, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 476-79.
200. The influence is indicated by the letters to all the legislators and the Governor. See id. at
561-67, 596 P.2d at 354-57, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 476-79.
201. See Id. at 520 n.4, 596 .P.2d at 330 nA, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 452 n.4.
202. Id. at 559-60, 596 P.2d at 353-54, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76.
203. Id. at 520 n.4, 596 P.2d at 330 n.4, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 454 n.4.
204. See id. at 560, 596 P.2d at 354, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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ACLU letter was not contemporaneous with the enactment of the bill;
the letter was dated September 18, 1975,205 and the legislature passed
the bill and sent it to enrollment on September 11, 1975, seven days
before the date of the ACLU letter.2"6 This potential aid, then, could
not have affected the vote of the legislature and should not have been
used as a source of legislative intent by the Tanner court.
Under the preceding analysis of the extrinsic aids utilized in the Tan-
ner decision, it may be seen that any of the four elements of the model
can be used in justifying or discrediting the validity of specific extrinsic
aids. In Tanner, the Legislative Counsel's digest of the bill did not in-
corporate significant subsequent amendments to the bill and the senate
committee memorandum never considered other probation statutes.20 7
The individual statements, including the governor's press release, the
ACLU letter, and two of the Attorney General's letters had no actual
opportunity to aid or influence the legislature in its decisionmaking
process.2" 8 Additionally, all of the Attorney General's letters are re-
moved from the essence of the legislative process, and must be ex-
amined only as another organization outside the legislature interested
greatly in promulgating its own legislation. 209
CONCLUSION
The Tanner case in particular illustrates the need for a rational and
objective means of evaluating the relative values of the multitude of
potential extrinsic aids modernly available to the courts of California.
In determining legislative intent, each of these extrinsic aids should be
examined under the four elements of the model to develop the approxi-
mate worth of the outside source. By using these four elements, a more
thorough analysis of proffered evidence of legislative intent can be ac-
complished, one that will hopefully be more reliable. There can be no
absolute test in the area of legislative intent. Analysis must proceed on
a case-by-case basis because of the rich and varied potential sources of
legislative intent available to the courts of California. These sources,
when scrutinized under the model, may serve as a clearer window into
the shadowed world of legislative intent.
Walter Kendall Hurst
205. Id. at 565, 596 P.2d at 355, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
206. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1975-76 REGULAR SESSION, SENATE FINAL HISTORY 161
(1976) (history of SB 278, which amended Penal Code Section 1203.06).
207. See notes 183-189 and accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 189-206 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 194-200 and accompanying text supra.
